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 In its extensive play with character and form, Bergman’s 
Persona becomes as difficult to analyze as an actual patient. Susan 
Sontag talks about how the viewer can only move toward but never 
achieve certainty about the action (129). Simply, it is about two 
women whose conflicting desires lead them to spend a cathartic 
summer at a seaside cottage. Critic John Simon describes the movie 
as a meditation on the numbers 1 and 2: it is about one splitting in 
two and two becoming one (216). The film is constantly attempting 
to balance, or at least justify, the existence of  the disparities and 
paradoxes of  life, many of  which become embodied in Elisabet 
and Alma. Many critics have written on the opposing duality of  
female spectatorship, and I would argue that by reading the two 
women as active and passive gazes we can unlock the riddle of  
Ingmar Bergman’s poetic film. 
 The first question is: what, really, is wrong with Elisabet? 
She seems very healthy but for her silence, which, as Alma 
immediately notes, seems self-controlled. Even when the two 
women reach the cottage by the sea she remains absolutely silent, 
though in a letter home she says that her soul is seeming to smooth 
over. John Simon notes that a clue is given in the title. In Latin, 
“Persona” literally means mask. This is interesting enough, but 
Simon traces the roots of  the word further. While Persona was 
being made, Ingmar Bergman was reading Carl Jung, who defines 
“Persona” as the role a that someone plays for the benefit of  others, 
as well as to satisfy their own expectations of  self  (Simon 224). 
So when Elisabet suddenly stops on stage, with the urge to laugh 
followed by a plunge into silence, it seems that she suddenly realizes 
what Shakespeare means when he writes, “all the world’s a stage.” I 
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can see why she would laugh; she is doing the deed. While on stage 
she realizes that every action, whether in life or theater, is an act; 
there is a painful irony in the uniform dishonesty of  everything. 
 Alma and Elisabet both return to the mirror stage of  their 
development at the summer cottage. This is a pre-lingual stage 
that begins as a child first recognizes him or herself  in the mirror, 
typically sometime between 6 and 18 months (Lacan 2). This 
recognition is our first sense of  self. We realize that the reflection 
is us; we say, “That is me.” Even more than this, we perceive the 
reflection as something that we should be. The reflective gestalt 
is inevitably separate, causing a personal anxiety that we do not 
measure up to what we are supposed to be (Lacan 4). As we grow 
older, the mirror stage continues and expands beyond our own 
reflection, or, rather, it expands to include those in whom we find a 
reflection of  ourselves. Cinema provides this reflection as much as, 
if  not more than, any other experience. 
 In Persona, for example, Alma tells Elisabet that, when 
she left the actress’ last film she was struck by how similar they 
looked and even thought that she, too, could be like Elisabet if  
she tried. But, she concedes that she is not as pretty as Elisabet is 
and admits that she is too lazy to change. It is interesting to note 
Elisabet’s similarity to the cinema screen. She is, after all, one of  
its stars, and the first time we see her she is in makeup on stage. 
Plus, like the screen, she is silent and unresponding. This vacancy 
allows the pent up Alma to speak to her as an analysand would 
to their psychoanalyst (Renn). In Elisabet, Alma experiences a 
multidimensional effect of  the cinema in her waking life. Critic 
Laura Mulvey explains how Lacan’s mirror stage is satisfied in 
voyeuristic gaze, for when we project ourselves onto the silent 
screen our repressed desires emerge (2). And as the movie unfolds, 
this is precisely what happens. 
 Elisabet has almost completely returned to the mirror stage. 
She has reverted to a time before speech; she is only receptive and 
gives no output. When we first see her in the hospital, she is nearly 
vacant, and we do not see her show any emotion until, in her room 
at night, she reacts with terror to footage of  Thich Quang Duc’s 
self  immolation. Since Elisabet has returned to the mirror stage, 
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she is terrified as she relates to Thich Quang Duc. As someone 
rebelling silently, she is struck at the possible outcome of  a refusal 
to comply. Elisabet no longer acknowledges any defining traits 
and does not seem to want to speak to or of  her family. To quote 
Mulvey again, “the sense of  forgetting the world as the ego has 
subsequently come to perceive it (I forgot who I am and where I 
was) is nostalgically reminiscent of  the” mirror stage (3). In a way, 
the two women have joined us as members of  the audience, by 
which I mean that they, too, can be psychologically affected by the 
film. 
 It is hard to say what exactly the two women represent. 
Consensus always defines them as opposites: as two sides of  the 
same woman (which seems, to me, a little too much like a kitschy 
psychological thriller), as analyst and patient (Renn) or as corrupted 
action and “ingenious soul” (Sontag 136). The most enlightening 
idea, which is mentioned in many places including Sontag’s essay, 
interviews with the actresses, and most notably in John Simon’s 
essay on the film, relies on August Strindberg’s play The Stronger, 
which features two characters, one silent and one talkative (Simon 
299). There are many readings that this play can contribute to the 
film, but for this essay I will focus on the difference between the 
passive, or silent, character and the active, speaking, character.  
 The passive/active binary is one of  seemingly endless 
disparities that the film confronts in Alma and Elisabet’s 
distant statues. They are such opposites that any duality can be 
represented in their arguments. It is important to note, again, 
Simon’s comment that Persona is about one splitting into two and 
two becoming one (216). Simon cites Susan Sontag’s essay on 
the film where she says we are watching the story of  two women 
but also the two sides of  a single woman: the aforementioned 
corrupted action and ingenious soul, who flounders in contact with 
the corrupted action (136).1 Alma and Elisabet are two different 
women, this is certain, but they do literally become one in the 
famous shot of  their faces in amalgam. The double-function is 
disconcerting and it is one of  the ways in which the film finds its 
sublimity. For, in the summer cottage by the sea we find ourselves, 
1. This is eerily similar to Lacan’s definition of  the mirror stage in dreams, which 
I have included in the next footnote. 
with the women, attempting to balance or marry the paradoxes 
that we find in every hollow of  our inter- and intrapersonal 
relationships. 
 In film terms, this binary can be shown by the two opposite 
views of  the female gaze in film as explored Laura Mulvey and 
Mary Ann Doane. The two women have reverted to the mirror 
stage, making the cinematic gaze function within the film as well as 
for those watching it.2 Both writers are concerned with female gaze 
in patriarchal cinema, where women are always objects of  desire. 
Even in Persona, a film with only two characters, both women, 
there is a patriarchal order. We see this effect on Alma manifested 
in her energies. Alma’s main focuses are her confusion and ennui. 
These come from her relationships with men: first in the five year 
affair with the married man and after in her engagement to Karl 
Heinrick. Elisabet, on the other hand, does now show Alma’s 
energy, as she is the object. Elisabet is both the object of  desire that 
cinema so often portrays and simultaneously a mother. Doane is 
working off of  Mulvey, who says the female gaze can function in 
two ways: the passive, or masochistic, and the active, or masculine, 
gazes (Doane 24). As Persona is working with the character divisions 
that Strindberg creates in The Stronger, there is a direct link to these 
roles, which are already fairly obvious. To be clear, Alma, the 
speaker, is the active character and the silent Elisabet is passive. 
 To explore this a little, let’s bring the active and 
passive gazes to the original level of  psychoanalysis. The three 
psychoanalytic critics that I have mentioned are each adding onto 
the work of  the critic that came before them; Doane is responding 
to Mulvey who is responding to Lacan. In his discussion of  the 
2. I find it interesting here to add a note on the setting. Lacan says that the 
mirror stage is represented in dreams by a castle which is “surrounded by 
marshes and rubbish-tips, dividing it into two opposed fields of  contest where 
the subject flounders in quest of  the lofty, remote inner castle whose form 
(sometimes juxtaposed in the same scenario) symbolizes the id in a quite startling 
way” (5). The summer cottage can easily be compared to this dream castle, as 
the sometimes marshy, always natural setting establishes the wild juxtaposition. 
Then, there is a beautiful shot of  Bibi Andersonn right after Alma reads 
Elisabet’s letter where she is standing on the edge of  a marshy pond looking at 
her reflection, and we can see her body full above the pond and below in the 
reflection. 
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mirror stage, Lacan marks the opposition between what he calls 
narcissistic libido, which is a function of  the pre-Oedipal gaze, 
and the sexual libido, which develops as humans move into the 
Oedipal stage (Lacan 6). I would argue that, as adults, when we 
watch a movie and return to the mirror stage we do not forget our 
learned sexual preferences as we have irrevocably passed through 
the Oedipal stage. I would align the activity of  Alma’s gaze with 
the sexual libido. We see this throughout the film as her problems 
seem all to be tied to sex: She is controlled by her relationships 
with men and deals explicitly with her sexual desire when she is in 
the cottage. This comes in three forms: memory, subversion, and 
action. Memory is the driving force during the intense scene in 
which she recounts her beach orgy. Sexual subversion drives Alma’s 
infatuation with Elisabet, and the subsequent action when she goes 
to bed with Herr Volger during the dream-like middle section of  
the film. Inversely, Elisabet’s return to the mirror stage is more 
complete; it functions on a narcissistic libido as we see in her refusal 
to speak and in her absorption in images on the television and the 
photographs of  her son and the Jewish Diaspora.
 Laura Mulvey goes further into the structures of  looking 
specifically as they apply to women. The active gaze (of  Alma), 
which Mulvey calls Scopophilic, recognizes itself  as a separate 
being from the object of  its desire in order to view the object 
erotically (3). Here, again, I will point to Alma’s direct reference 
to Elisabet’s film, but this time I want to point out the way she 
signifies difference, saying that Elisabet is much prettier. This 
happens more directly later in the film when the women begin 
merging and Alma repeatedly shouts, “I am not Elisabet Volger!” 
This gaze, Mulvey notes, aligns the female spectator with the male 
viewer in that they both desire to own the beauty on stage. She 
notes that once this desire is fulfilled, the glamour of  the beauty 
fades. In Persona this also happens directly. We first see Elisabet on 
stage, lit and with makeup on, but then Alma is given custody of  
her and she looks sickly without her makeup and stage demeanor. 
As with Lacan, Elisabet represents the Narcissistic gaze of  a 
woman, which Mulvey defines as the identification of  the ego with 
the object of  desire (3). For Elisabet this is easy because she is an 
actress; she is that staged object of  desire. This seems too easy. 
We have to ask, what is it that Elisabet desires? This question is 
difficult because, as a staged female there seems no other object 
of  desire. As a female, Freudian psychoanalysis would say that her 
desire is located within her lack of  a phallus. Then, Mulvey quotes 
Freud, who believed that the binary at the basis of  this formulation, 
the sexual and narcissistic libidos, were always overlaying and 
interacting. These two contradictory forces, she says, have found 
their place in the cinema which has “evolved a particular illusion 
of  reality in which this contradiction between libido and ego has 
found a beautifully complimentary fantasy world” (3). This sounds 
like it was written about Persona. I think one of  the most beautiful 
scenes in the film touches on this coexistence. The two women 
return from mushrooming and sit at a porch table and hum a duet, 
each part responding and adding to the other to form one piece of  
music.
 Doane, the latest critic of  the group, helps to answer 
some questions that have so far been left unanswered. Perhaps 
the added effect that Doane’s article has comes from its inclusion 
of  Metz’s idea about the distance between the voyeur and the 
object (23). This is something that Mulvey approaches when she 
is talking about how the active gaze keeps its object at an erotic 
distance, but she leaves it at that. Doane compares this look to the 
threat of  castration which a boy faces in the Oedipal stage, so it 
is “in the distance between the look and the threat that the boy’s 
relation to knowledge of  sexual difference is formulated” (23). In 
Persona I think this applies mostly to the young boy we see in the 
prologue and epilogue to the film, but the meaning of  this quote 
has to be changed for the cinema, or at least reevaluated into 
Metz’s definition. The cinema space would be between the viewer 
and the screen, and it would be here that sexual development is 
placed. In the case of  the boy, we see him reaching for the shifting 
faces of  the shrouded women. John Simon believes that this boy is 
Bergman, and he describes the distance into which he is reaching 
as the “evanescent frontier between reality and dream” (239). The 
shrouded, shifting women, then, are different aspects of  the desired 
mother. This point is supported by the repeated use of  the shroud 
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in the film. Whenever the shroud appears it is always framing the 
mother: Elisabet. 
 As the application of  Mulvey ends we are left with a scant 
understanding of  Elisabet’s passive gaze. We can take the theories 
so far as to say that she is attempting to resolve her lack, but this 
only leads us to ask the same questions that someone would ask 
at the beginning of  a discussion of  Persona. For instance, why is 
Elisabet quiet, or, a little bit more refined, how does she attempt 
to nullify this lack? Her career has not paid off what she thought it 
would. Her desires are as strong as ever. She is thrown off when a 
friend mentions her lack at a party, saying that she has everything, 
the career and marriage, but she lacks motherliness. This sends 
Elisabet down a new path to negate the lack; Doane calls this 
action the masquerade. The masquerade is a guise of  exaggerated 
femininity that attempts to nullify the lack by increasing the gap 
between the looker and the object (Doane 26). Again, I want to call 
the Jungian definition of  “Persona” to mind, as it is tied to the idea 
of  a masquerade. It is the social role that each of  us plays.  
 In the end, the problem for both women, both binaries of  
the female gaze or whatever duality we want to tie to them, is the 
ineffectivity of  their work. Both women are trying to conquer their 
lack, but to no avail. John Simon notes that “the two opposites, 
theatre and life, have become one in their joint untruthfulness” 
(265). Persona says it even more succinctly in Elisabet’s note to the 
nurse in which she summarizes some of  Alma’s near-incoherent 
chatter from the night before: She claims her perceptions do not 
match up with her actions. Neither Elisabet nor Alma can make 
sense of  their own actions. Alma begins her first monologue by 
noting that we can do whatever we want, but then talks about the 
life that she is predestined to live with her fiancée Karl Heinrich. 
She says that it is nothing to think about, that this future is inside 
her. In Alma and Elisabet’s relationship we see two oppositions 
affecting each other, sometimes well and sometimes destructively. 
 At the end of  the film, things have returned to normal. 
We see Bergman shooting a film with Elisabet and Alma gets on 
the bus going back, we assume, to everyday life. Nothing seems to 
have changed, but both women say that they learned a lot during 
their stay at the cabin. There is at least sufficient change to make 
Elisabet work and speak again. Elisabet and Alma must have come 
to accept their Persona; they have learned that these masks are 
not something that we can escape. Can truth manifest in social 
interaction? This we still do not know, but the women realize that 
we give of  our personal honesty as a sacrifice for our interactions 
with others. Our perception of  a person will never match their 
conception of  themselves. What Susan Sontag says of  the film 
can be said of  people, we can only move toward one another but 
never achieve certainty. As Sontag says, everything at the end of  
the film remains divided, though it is vampiristically intertwined 
(145). We have to remember that the first thing we see the boy in 
the prologue reach for, the frontier between reality and dream, is 
the audience. So the boy, Bergman, reaches out for life, sets reality 
as his ultimate desire. Persona is a powerful film because it shows us 
our innate desire for reality and life and at the end it sacrifices itself  
and falls off of  the reels. 
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